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Skills Brokerage:  
A New Business Model for Start-ups in the Networked Economy 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a new business model based on skill brokerage, aiming to 
facilitate business start-ups and enhance their chance of survival in the context of the 
networked economy. The model is based on the concept of an entrepreneur sharing the 
venture’s returns or even ownership with a skills broker in exchange for skills. This 
exchange can significantly reduce barriers in network-oriented and information-driven 
markets, where skills are of critical importance.  It can also significantly alleviate cash 
flow problems, typical of many new start ups and a main cause of business failure.  The 
model is particularly relevant to information-intensive ventures, where the value of a 
service is often significantly higher than the actual cost incurred by the skills providers in 
providing the service.  If the model can be made to work, it can not only significantly 
increase the number of business start-ups, but also enhances their chances of survival.  In 
this paper, we will illustrate this new business model, by providing three case studies, and 
explore its implications for theory, practice and policy.   
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Skills Brokerage:  
A New Business Model for Start-ups in the Networked Economy 
Introduction 
Lack of skills is a common component of underperformance in start-up companies. If 
this lack of skills could be addressed and the cost of acquiring skills could be minimized, 
then it follows that the chances of new ventures succeeding would be maximized. 
This paper presents the skills brokerage business model, which aims not only to 
increase start-up rates, but also to help ventures survive and grow. The model is based on 
the concept of an entrepreneur sharing the venture’s returns, or even ownership, with a 
skills broker in exchange for skills. The skills broker may just broke the skills required 
for the venture or actually provide them himself. In the context of this paper we consider 
the skills brokers as skills providers who independently negotiate the skills exchanges. 
The exchange can significantly reduce barriers in network-oriented and information-
driven markets, where skills are of critical importance. “Entrepreneurs or intrapreneurs 
who develop knowledge and skills than can be readily redeployed in other ventures can 
more safely enter into new markets, products or technologies.” (Zahra & Dess, 2001). 
The model can also significantly alleviate cash flow problems, typical of many new 
start ups and a main cause of business failure. The example of Digital Media Houses 
(DMH) is given in order to illustrate the key issues. Skill brokerage has a wide range of 
implications. We provide an outline for the main ones for entrepreneurs, policy makers, 
business incubators, venture capitalists and academics.  
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The skills brokerage business model 
According to Low (2001), although entrepreneurship is not a new research area it has 
become a popular topic in the last 15-20 years, mainly driven by fundamental changes in 
the business environment and the demands of the ‘new economy’. “The opportunity is to 
provide models and concepts to explain and facilitate commerce in the new economy, 
while the potential pitfall is that this task is too broad and unfocused to be achievable.” 
(Low, 2001) The skills brokerage business model is such a model, aiming at facilitating 
venture creation by addressing one of the main reasons hindering companies 
performance: the lack of skills (Kakati, 2003). It can also reduce the amount of cash 
required by the new start up, especially during early stages of its operation, a major cause 
of new venture failure.  
Start-up costs and lack of skills are two of the main challenges that entrepreneurs 
have to face when starting up new ventures.  When it comes to e-business ventures, these 
costs usually translate to the cost for developing ICT systems and professional support 
services, i.e. services that are very skills-oriented. If these skills were to be provided by 
organisations or professionals in exchange for a share of the venture’s returns or even a 
minority share of the venture, then the risks involved in starting up would be significantly 
reduced. Even in industries where skills play an indirect role, one could still find ways to 
reduce the venture’s risks using skills (Sonfield & Lussier, 1997). Equally importantly, 
bringing skills in-house and locking them there for a period of time can help the venture 
survive and grow. 
Skills brokerage is fundamentally different from normal business exchanges and 
transactions, in that the exchange involves direct access to the venture’s returns and may 
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involve sharing part of the ownership.  As a result, the exchange leads to a medium or 
long-term partnership. The venture does not just briefly benefit from an injection of skills 
and expertise. It gets to access these throughout the time of the agreement between the 
entrepreneur and the skills broker. From a skills provider’s perspective, this is often an 
attractive option, because the actual costs incurred in providing a service are often 
significantly less than the market value of the service the new business venture seeks and 
acquires.  This is especially so in information-intensive activities where the cost of 
information to the owner/provider is often significantly less than the value of the 
information to particular buyers.  
Skills brokerage is not the same as outsourcing. If sufficient resources are available, 
outsourcing can help overcome skill gaps. Still the key management concern of how to 
undertake sourcing to improve operational efficiency or to enhance value-adding business 
capability remains (Chung, Yam, & Chan, 2004). Skills brokerage can address both the 
lack of resources and the value-adding concern as external skills are locked in for a 
certain time. 
As a model of facilitating entrepreneurship, skills brokerage can be studied through 
two main ‘lenses’; namely that of the venture and that of the skills broker.  
In the first case the venture is the point of focus with the entrepreneur and the skills 
brokers placing themselves around it (Figure 1). Fundamentally, the entrepreneur does 
not differ from the rest of the skill brokers, in that he brings his own skill set to the 
project, including opportunity recognition (Park, 2005). In fact, we consider all skills 
brokers and investors, especially investors who get actively involved in the venture 
(Erikson & Sorheim), to be entrepreneurial in nature, otherwise they would not have the 
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propensity to act as brokers and take on risks. However, we distinguish the entrepreneur 
from the rest, because he is the one who will conceive the idea and lay the foundations 
for the project. Skills brokers are actually acting similarly to the entrepreneur, i.e. looking 
for opportunities (Landstrom, 1998). The only difference is that they invest their skills in 
an already identified opportunity and the venture established to exploit it. 
Of course, the idea itself is only part of the equation. The entrepreneur needs to have 
many developed skills. For example, Chen et al. (Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998) suggest 
the following key skills areas: marketing, innovation, management, risk taking and 
financial control. If any of these areas are not developed enough, the skills gap can be 
covered by a skills broker. 
In the second case the model can be viewed from the skill broker’s point of view. 
The focus is on sharing the broker’s skills among the projects with which he is involved, 
making skills brokerage his business model. The skills broker, as an entrepreneur, 
actively seeks opportunities to invest his skills, taking on risk in order to assume greater 
returns. He can also act as facilitator for skill sharing among the projects themselves, 
forming a link between them.  
The interactions between the skills broker and the entrepreneur, as well as the 
interactions between the skills brokers themselves, will differ from venture to venture, as 
will the skills offered and the type of exchange that will take place. These will depend 
entirely on the negotiating agents. For example, an entrepreneur may offer 10% stake in a 
company in exchange for software development time or offer 25% of the profits for three 
years in exchange for marketing services. A combination of these exchanges can take 
place for each venture. Entrepreneurs and skill brokers could even auction their offerings 
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in order to attract better deals. For example, an entrepreneur may invite skills brokers to 
bid, on a specific service or skill, and then select the best offering. 
Looking at the skills brokerage model as the broker’s business model, one may 
initially question its viability, as the skills investments return may take time to reach the 
skills broker. One solution is for the skills-broker to negotiate immediate on-going 
payments at low rates that would still allow the venture to operate and ensure its viability. 
Such deals are up to the entrepreneur and the skills brokers to reach. One should also 
remember that money is not always the main motivation for entrepreneurs  (Amit, 
MacCrimmon, Zietsma, & Oesch, 2001) and that investors are not always interested in 
short-term economic returns (Landstrom, 1998). Also, E-Business models do not have to 
generate profit immediately to be strategically important (Lam & Harrison-Walker, 
2003). At the end of the day, if all businesses could break even from the very first day, 
then there would have been no challenges in the business world!  
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Figure 1: The venture is the point of focus with the entrepreneur and the skills brokers placing 
themselves around it. 
 
In both cases mentioned above the model aims to address the main questions posed 
by Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) definition of entrepreneurship and framework. 
Their definition focuses on the following issues: 
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into existence;  
 why, when and how some people and not others discover and exploit these 
opportunities; and  
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By focusing on the opportunity and its exploitation Shane and Venkataraman focused 
more on the process that the entrepreneurs follow in order to create value and hence shift 
the interest away from “who” to “how”. This allows them to avoid the dead end of “trait 
research” (Davidsson, 2003). In the skills brokerage business model there are no 
assumptions on the characteristics and attributes of the entrepreneurs involved. They are 
only required to assume the risks of being involved in a venture. The model’s focal point 
is on how risks can be managed and minimised, providing an alternative way for 
facilitating venture creation and growth. 
In addition, their definition does not pose any restriction on the type, age or 
ownership of the actor who will be perusing an opportunity, and hence their framework 
covers both new ventures and corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, Kuratko, & Jennings, 
1999). This is in contrast with other definitions that require the emergence of a new 
organisation as a requirement for entrepreneurship (Gartner, 1988).  
This is of importance for our model as both the entrepreneur and the skills broker 
may be coming from an existing corporate environment, i.e. the model does not impose 
any limitations on the background or state of the entrepreneurs involved and hence does 
not exclude corporate venturing (Carland & Carland, 1988). In turbulent environments 
companies have to appreciate the importance of innovation, risk taking and proactive 
entrepreneurial behaviour if they are to survive (Zahra et al., 1999). Skill brokerage 
provides established organisations with a way to utilise existing knowledge, skills and 
resources in new innovative ways. 
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Similarly, their definition does not pose any requirements on the modes of action that 
will be used to exploit an opportunity like other definitions do. For example, Schumpeter 
(1934) identified five innovative strategic postures as indications of entrepreneurial 
behaviour, while Drucker (1985) postulated that innovation is a requirement for 
entrepreneurship. In such cases one is in the difficult situation of having to draw a line in 
an attempt to define the boundary of innovation. In fact, one wonders “whether the first 
entrant in an industry should be considered the entrepreneurial firm while all subsequent 
entrants would be small businesses” (Gartner, 1988). For the skills broker this is of 
interest as value can be generated by reapplying skills, information, experience and 
technology from previous projects. Reusing these, would dilute the importance of their 
value and would render any future use less important.  
If one assumes that the use of skills can actually lower barriers, then it follows that 
more players may attempt to enter a market, which would lead to increased competition. 
Such competition boost would force all market players to become more innovative in an 
attempt to stay ahead of their competitors. As a result, skills brokerage could indirectly 
force all organisations in a market to become more competitive. 
Information-driven markets 
Skills are of critical importance for information driven markets and businesses, like 
e-business, as they are usually the cornerstone of the firm’s offering. Information and 
technology can be reused at a very small cost or even at no cost at all, provided one owns 
the intellectual property rights. This allows the skill broker to offer his skills and services 
at costs that are much lower than their market value, reducing the risks involved for the 
skill provider.  
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For example, if an entrepreneur wanted to start an online shop he would have had to 
commission the technology to a developer. If a second entrepreneur also commissioned 
an online shop, the developer could have offered the technology he had already 
developed, in exchange for venture returns or even stakes in the venture. For the 
developer there is very little or no additional cost in reinstalling the software, while the 
entrepreneur can divert the capital that would have otherwise needed to invest in the 
technology for other activities, e.g. marketing, thereby easing the pressure for capital 
requirement and cash flows.  
An example – Digital Media House (DHM) 
Digital media is a catch-all term for all forms of electronic communication. Digital 
Media House (DMH) sizes can range from micro-sized organisations, including sole-
traders, to large organisations with significant numbers of developers.  
We selected a high-technology sector because of its importance in both the local and 
global economies (Park, 2005), and its characteristics of high career mobility and new 
venture initiation (Amit et al., 2001). In addition high-technology firms usually work in 
truly extreme environments where “survival, let alone growth, is dependent on finding 
and exploiting a reliable innovation strategy quickly” (Park, 2005).    
DMHs possess the tools for the creation of value on electronic media, such as the 
Internet. These tools are often applied to a wide range of marketplaces via their clients’ 
projects (e.g. a DMH may build a web site for a car manufacturer to promote their latest 
models and then create a B2B auction service). This is very similar to the software 
industry providing the enabling tools and infrastructure to IT professionals in virtually all 
other industries (Nowak & Grantham, 2000). 
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Traditionally, DMHs offer their services for a fee which is usually a reflection of the 
time required to implement the project’s specification. In our model, instead of charging 
the customer for implementing the specification, the DMH becomes part of the project 
itself, by offering its skills. In return, the customer, who is then promoted to a partner, 
offers part of the venture’s returns or even shares in the venture, locking the DMH to the 
project.  
The decision as to whether a DMH will get involved in a project as a skills broker or 
not, will require assessment of the project itself. This means that skills that were not 
required in their market may be needed in order to make a judgement on the potential of a 
project. Normally, a DMH would implement a specification irrespective of whether this 
corresponded to a good business model. In a skills brokerage scenario a decision to get 
involved in a project will rely on the DMH assessing the business plan and deciding 
whether the project can justify the risks involved.  
The primary argument against such an approach is that working on many projects 
simultaneously will dilute the DMH’s attention and will jeopardise the success of all the 
projects involved, including the viability of the DMH itself. This is a challenge that 
investors with big portfolios may face (Kanniainen & Keuschnigg, 2004).  
On the other hand, such an approach could provide: 
1. Higher returns for successful projects. Projects do not generate one-off revenues, 
but continuous returns. 
2. Resilience. If the core activity of an organisation is threatened the viability of the 
organisation is also threatened. Multiple activities will mean that no single 
activity/project can bring an organisation to a halt. 
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3. Utilisation of resources that may have otherwise not been used, for example 
unused development time between projects. 
4. Networking and access to resources. The skills broker’s network can spread to a 
much wider extent, as it will also be utilising the partners’ networks. 
 
From the partners point of view utilising the skills offered by a skill broker means 
that that he has a platform from which he can launch projects that otherwise he would not 
start, due to the start-up costs. In the skill broker’s case these costs will translate to the 
time required for the DMH to complete a project, with the final ‘real’ cost usually being a 
fraction of what the customer would have been required to pay.  
The skills brokerage business model is also favoured by the fact that most digital 
media projects are small-scale projects with short timetables. As such, the involvement of 
a DMH in a project will not require extended commitment. Once the project is deployed, 
the partners will look over the project, freeing the skill broker to undertake a new project. 
Still, the DMH will have to monitor the partner’s activities, which raises questions about 
the organisation’s structure and the administration practices that have to be adopted. 
The skills brokerage business model has another attraction for a DMH. A major 
challenge for new media companies is valuating their work. A project is usually valued 
based on many parameters, such as the time required to complete the project, the 
resources needed, the perceived value of the project, the financial status of the client and 
so on. Still, the final price may not necessarily translate to the value of the project or to 
what the customer may have been willing to pay. “As markets set prices on known 
technology not new methods, that may be discovered in the future, prices do not reflect 
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the relative benefits of different innovations if they would be introduced in the future.” 
(Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) In addition, in most cases the customer tries to minimise the 
fees involved by taking advantage of the many DMHs that will bid for a project. Even 
worse for the DMH, the globalisation that the Internet resulted in means that inexpensive 
DMH markets, such as India, can often offer more competitive prices for a project. In a 
skills brokerage scenario, pricing is replaced by the valuation of what the skills are worth 
in the context of the project. This prevents commoditisation of the services they provide 
by using a risk-assumptive market-based proactive and flexible approach to pricing and 
valuing of their work; what Shindehutte and Morris (2001) refer to as entrepreneurial 
pricing.  
Finally, the DMH could become a skills broker for their own ideas using their skills 
to start new ventures and utilising unused recourses; namely free developing time and 
already-developed technology. An example of such approach is Friends Reunited, which 
started as a bedroom-based company before becoming a venture worth millions of 
pounds. The concept behind Friends Reunited was conceived by Julie Pankhurst who did 
not have the skills to build the site. Fortunately for her, her husband Stephen did! Acting 
as a skills broker he wrote the technology to bring the idea to life, without making any 
significant financial investment.  
Case studies 
Identifying case studies has proven to be a major challenge as it is not always clear or 
even possible to know the relationships among the venture’s stakeholders. To address this 
issue social mapping techniques could be employed to map entrepreneurial networks in 
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an attempt to find out whether brokerage relationships exist and to what extend. Then, 
these could be supplemented by interviews with the stakeholders of each venture. 
In this section we present three mini-case studies of North East of England based 
companies that employed the skills brokerage model. Two of these cases are based on the 
experiences of one of the authors, while the third is based on an interview with the 
stakeholders of the venture.  
Gaia Fulfilment Ltd 
Gaia Fulfilment (http://www.gaia-fulfilment.co.uk) is a leading company in 
Collateral Fulfilment - that is the delivery of high quality printed marketing and technical 
collateral world wide for next day delivery via the web. Gaia delivers products and 
services to organisation that recognize the value and power of quality, accurate and 
timely business documents, by offering a diverse product set of printing solutions. Gaia’s 
customers can order anything from a business card and business brochures to fully 
branded documents, e.g. for direct mail campaigns. The minimum order quantity is one 
document, something which Gaia achieved by employing digital printing devices, as 
traditional lithographic printing is not economically viable for very short print jobs. Its 
founders were Andy Bex and Ian Scanlan. Andy Bex, a managing director of two other 
IT companies, brought his technical and managerial skills to the project, while Ian 
Scanlan, who had worked for 15 years in sales for a large corporate, brought his 
marketing and sales skills. 
When Gaia decided to extend their product portfolio, they recruited Savvas 
Papagiannidis to develop part of the technology. Initially, the relationship was based on a 
traditional outsourcing model. However it was soon realised that this was not a viable 
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model as the amount of development time required would have stretched the company’s 
cash flow. The two sides agreed to work on a profit sharing basis which was then 
converted into equity as Savvas Papagiannidis became an integral part of the project.  
As a result, the company managed to survive four years of development and came 
out of the development process with seven products. Gaia's software solutions gained 
national recognition for e-business innovation by being one of a handful of finalist at the 
2004 eCommerce Awards organised by the UK Department of Trade and Industry. If 
Gaia had not employed the model and simply outsourced development, the company 
would have had to divert its cash resources to the development affecting the rest of the 
business development. Moreover, by bringing skills in house and employing the skills 
brokerage model, Gaia ensured that Savvas Papagiannidis’ interest in the business was 
maintained, which translated not only to contributions to the technical development, but 
to the business development as well.  
From the skills broker’s point of view being involved in a promising venture justified 
lowering the short-term return expectations. Innovation and the excitement of being 
involved in a brand new technology were of more value compared to short term monetary 
returns (Amit et al., 2001; Landstrom, 1998). Such entrepreneurial approach though was 
at times very stressful, as the skills broker had to generate his survival income through 
other projects. Also, although in this case the Gaia management team saw the benefits of 
bringing skills in-house, there is no guarantee that the broker will eventually see through 
the long term benefits. This is of particular importance for projects in which the skills 
broker was not involved from the very beginning. Hence, trust is of critical significance, 
especially in cases where there are implicit verbal agreements instead of contractual ones. 
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Gaia's forecasted license sales alone for 2006 are £150k, in addition to ongoing 
printing revenue.  As the licenses are growing and are renewable it gives the business a 
significant book value giving a significant return to the skill brokers who invested in the 
company. As with most business models a skill broker must be capable of seeing a 
proportionate return on their skill investment, in this case where the work was over a long 
period and quite intensive the return must also be great. Unlike many business models 
where growth can be stilted by being limited to key people, Gaia has the benefit of 
potentially growing exponentially being a global technology-based organisation. 
Official Player Sites Ltd 
Official Player Sites (http://www.officialplayersites.com) is an example of a venture 
that was established when two skills brokers came up with the business idea. The 
company was incorporated in 2002, bringing together the technical skills and access to IT 
infrastructure of Savvas Papagiannidis and the journalistic skills and industry contacts of 
Andrew Burns. The idea was to build official sites for professional footballers. The site 
hosted more than 15 official sites and also provided links and mini-profiles for many 
hundreds of professional football players. Each site was updated regularly by both the 
player and the editorial staff, with the sole intention of giving visitors unparalleled access 
to the latest news, views and opinions of their favourite players. All these sites together 
resulted in a football portal that used the players’ as the journalists.  
 In early 2005 the site had on average a quarter of a million unique visits a year. Still, 
this level of traffic was not deemed sufficient for advertisers in the sport market to invest 
in the project, and as a result the company had problems generating sufficient revenue. 
Eventually the company filled for a voluntary striking-off from the Companies House 
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register in order to minimise the administration that was required for the project. Still, the 
web site remains operational and is updated regularly. 
In Official Players Sites case skills were paramount in the entrepreneurs’ decision to 
establish the venture. It was a natural progression from their previously established 
businesses, which when brought together resulted in Official Players Sites. Although the 
company did not make any substantial sales, by having all skills in house, it managed to 
have almost no expenses which allowed it to operate for a long time. 
Such an approach to business venturing can be considered a powerful market 
research tool as the business idea is tested for real in the market. If the market responds, 
then the entrepreneurs and skills brokers can take the venture to the next level by 
committing more time and resources to it. On the other hand, such an approach may work 
against the venture’s success as there is no ‘pressure’ to succeed.  
Also, although the advertising space was not sold to sponsors it was used for other 
projects that they two founders were involved, hence benefiting them by generating 
traffic. This kind of resource sharing among projects can help reduce costs even further 
and boost the development and growth of existing and future projects.  
Bundles & Arjuna  
Bundles is a company created by three directors to implement an idea developed 
early in 2004.  Two of the directors, Robert Cole (ex-HP) and Glenn Morrill, created 
Silvaager in 2002 and Glenn’s chance re-acquaintance with John Gibson, a business 
colleague from the 80’s at Northern Rock, spawned the business idea. Arjuna 
Technologies (http://www.arjuna.com/) is an independent supplier of distributed 
transaction processing and messaging software, helping companies guarantee business 
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process reliability and safeguard mission-critical data. Arjuna Technologies was formed 
from the former Hewlett-Packard Arjuna Lab, HP's centre of excellence for 
transactioning and related technologies.  
Bundles approached Arjuna looking for an IT partner to develop a solution for the 
financial industry (details about the project were not disclosed as it was under 
development when the interview was conducted). The model used for their collaboration 
was based on a mixture of skills brokerage and development fees. For Bundles 
outsourcing the development of the technology was the preferred approach due to better 
utilisation of resources.  
The challenge though was to find someone who would have had similar values, as 
they considered them of critical importance to the technical and business development. 
Bundles looked at their business network and approached Arjuna with the idea. If 
Bundles had to look for partners outside their network, then perhaps the skill brokerage 
model may not have been a viable alternative. As one of their directors said: “To be 
honest, if we had looked around for partners, there would have been an awful lot of 
tension”. Even so, they did approach a number of technical organisations, only to 
conclude that they did not have anywhere close to the skills set that was required for the 
project; skills set that matched Arjuna’s technical profile. Public networking 
organisations did not appeal to them either, when it came to finding a partner, as they can 
not guarantee the quality of the recommended services. Such organisations can not afford 
to be seen as making subjective recommendations. A skills brokerage database could 
have helped business support organisations overcome such issues. 
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Another important point for Bundles was the strategic selection of partners. Although 
there were other areas that could have been brokered, they did not believe it would have 
been in their interest to do so: “we need to be careful not to allow equity to drift away”.  
When it came to raising funds early in the project, venture capital was not an 
approach that the company wanted to employ. Raising funds is a job in itself and would 
have required a substantial effort to be put into it: “What you find is that early-start 
funding is not as attainable as it is made out”. Still this is an open front for the project, 
which should now be more attractive for investors, as it brings forward the combined 
skills and knowledge of the two working groups.  In this case the skills brokerage model 
has played a double role; it helped the venture get off the ground and also brought it 
closer to a point in which external funding will be easier to be raised. 
In the skills brokerage model the incentives need to be big enough to justify the 
broker’s involvement. Development fees in this case ensured that Arjuna was 
compensated for their work, but at the same time their equity stake helped maintain their 
long term interest in the venture. 
Extending the model 
In the previous section we examined how the skills brokerage business model could 
benefit DMHs, by fully utilising their IT skills. The rest of the skills required to start a 
new venture, like financial, legal and marketing (Gartner, 1988) can be invested by other 
skill brokers.  
A number of skills brokers could come together, forming a one-stop skills service: ‘a 
skills capitalist’. Skills brokers would then act similarly to venture capitalists by 
assessing the potential of business plans in order to make a decision whether to invest or 
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not. Such a model could lead to virtual organisations sharing skills and resources and 
using them only when required. Scale of skills and resources usage among the 
organisations could provide a significant competitive advantage, as entrepreneurs could 
focus on development of their start-ups.  
The ‘skill capitalist’ business model is different from incubators offering business 
support services (Lyons, 2000), as the incubator’s service provision is undertaken on a 
provider-client basis, instead of an investing basis. Another difference is that ventures in 
which a ‘skills capitalist’ has invested have higher chance of synergy, as they share the 
same investor. Strategically selected ventures can allow the ‘skill capitalist’ to create a 
number of ventures in a market of interest, giving the investor a bigger share and 
potentially market control and higher returns. Business incubators can facilitate 
networking, this can take time and does not guarantee the establishing of any significant 
relationships. 
Implications 
The skills brokerage model can either work independently of existing venture 
creation processes or it can complement them. Either way, it can have profound 
implications when it comes to establishing new ventures and sustaining them. Some of 
the implications for entrepreneurs, policy makers, business incubators, venture capitalists 
and academics are outlined below. 
Entrepreneurs 
As entrepreneurs can often be very protective of their ‘creations’, one could be led to 
the conclusion that sharing part of the venture may not be an attractive proposition for the 
entrepreneur. Although this is true, one has to remember that entrepreneurs do share their 
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ventures in order to raise capital. In fact, entrepreneurs with less financial means are 
likely to surrender more control to capital investors (Hellmann, 1998). If there is one key 
investor then this could cause a management dipole, with the entrepreneur and the 
investor at each end, which could potentially create a lot of tension; even force the 
entrepreneur out of the venture he started. (Hellmann, 1998; Oakey, 2003). In the skills 
brokerage business model, instead of cash a venture receives skills by private skill 
investors who would have less bargaining power compared to venture capitalists. Skills 
brokerage can also be a better alternative to venture capital when venture capital is 
primarily aimed to skill-oriented services, as the cost of renting or buying skills will be 
higher. 
Skills brokerage may also be attractive proposition for serial entrepreneurs, who do 
not necessarily lack capital resources, and would not mind co-sharing a number of 
ventures. It may also be attractive for entrepreneurs of failed ventures: “an entrepreneur 
who believed that a weakness in marketing was the key to the failure of a past venture 
may be more likely to develop contacts or form a management team that overcomes that 
skills gap” (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
In any way, the model could also be based on a fraction of future returns, rather than 
equity, so this should not be a detrimental barrier to the success of the business.  
One could argue that the skills brokerage business model would be more attractive to 
small and medium enterprises as: 
1. SMEs are more flexible and adaptable to changes. 
2. SMEs are more willing to take risks in order to gain higher returns. 
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3. SMEs need to be more innovative in order to survive and prosper in the 
demanding information-driven market places. 
 
Large firms may have an abundance of knowledge and technology they are not 
always the best vehicle to recognise the opportunities of the future (Park, 2005). Even so, 
they could still use the model as a ‘platform’ for future investments by allocating 
resources to create the skills broker. The corporate skill broker would then invest in the 
venture as normal, limiting the risk for the parent company within certain boundaries.  
There could also be tax benefits for all parties involved since there is no money 
changing hands, until the venture is successful.    
Policy Makers and Business Support Organisations 
Support services often focus on generic skills and services in an effort to 
accommodate clients with different requirements. Although this is valuable when it 
comes to developing enterprising attitudes, it is not necessarily beneficial for 
entrepreneurship: “one size does not fit all” (Lyons, 2000). In such a case highly 
specialized knowledge and actions are often required if a project is to be successful. 
According to Davidsson and Honig (2003) the value of all forms of standard recipe is 
likely to be very limited, and the real needs are often beyond the capacity of a generalist 
advisor. “The implications are that individuals are taught to engage in activities that are 
not necessarily productively linked toward successful outcomes.” (Davidsson & Honig, 
2003) 
This explains why business support services often subsidies specialised services. The 
challenge is though that they can only support a limited number of ventures, as they have 
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limited funds. The skills brokerage business model can replace (or work in parallel to) 
subsided services and grant provisions by bringing together service providers and 
entrepreneurs.  
The research by Davidsson and Honig also suggests that national and regional 
governments should consider “developing business centres that focus on the facilitation 
of community and networking activities, thereby increasing each nascent entrepreneur’s 
probability of finding the idiosyncratic inputs s/he needs”. Again, the focus is on the 
individual needs rather than generic business activities, and as a result a more specialised 
approach is required. 
In addition, skills brokerage can form an alternative mode of employment which 
promotes entrepreneurial freelancing. This could be used to tackle unemployment by 
actively encouraging, through policy, new ventures that are based on this model. Offering 
grants to such projects could provide them with an incentive to start skills brokerage-
based ventures, especially when it comes to community venturing and non-profit 
organisations or when the aim is to boost start-up rates and employment in under-
developed regions. 
Such initiatives, especially new, high technology-based firms, have become major 
policy objectives of virtually every developed nation. This is probably a result of the 
“realisation that the failure of the European economy to create jobs is not in the 
traditional manufacturing or public sector jobs, but in the services and the ‘new 
economy’, where job creation is more in the hands of small entrepreneurs than in the 
hand of large corporations” (Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia, & Pissarides, 2001). Models such as 
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skills brokerage could play pivotal roles in economic growth, by encouraging start-ups 
and job creation.  
Business Incubators  
Davidsson and Honig’s business centres could also be extended to incubators. 
Favourable rents for space and equipment are important, but “incubators should focus 
more on the development of business networks that would help companies survive in the 
long run”. (Bollingtoft & Ulhoi, 2005) These networks could consist of traditional networks 
or skills brokerage networks. Incubators may subsidise or even offer free incubation 
services in exchange for access to the venture. The returns could be much higher, with 
the incubator being transformed from an accommodation provider to a skills broker and 
an investor. This is what Allen and Rahman (1985) looked into with their study: “an 
incubator becomes more than just a physical arrangement with a specific geographical 
location where a new venture can minimize start-up costs by accessing affordable space, 
shared services, and business assistance”.  The incubator can provide the space and 
business services and the skills brokers the business assistance. 
Venture Capitalists 
The skills brokerage business model can benefit entrepreneurs looking for venture 
capital for activities that can not be provided through skills, e.g. buying of equipment, as 
it can increase the chances of a project attracting funding. First of all, by bringing skills 
in-house, the entrepreneur minimises the requirements for capital, which would require 
smaller scale finance. More importantly, the in-house skills and the broker’s networks 
and experience can significantly raise the venture’s credibility, increasing the chances of 
getting funded. 
 25 
In fact, venture capitalists often provide skills, experience, networks and credibility 
to a new venture as part of the funding process (Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003), in an 
effort to shape the future in ways that improve the outcome of their investment (von Burg 
& Kenney, 2000). “Given the often limited business competence of the founding 
entrepreneur, venture capital advice, in building business relations, hiring the right 
personnel and marketing product etc., becomes a key complementary expertise to 
entrepreneurial efforts.” (Kanniainen & Keuschnigg, 2004)  Hence, from the venture 
capitalists’ perspective, skills brokerage can not only reduce the funding requirements of 
new ventures, but also increase their chances of survival. Still, “in spite of initial scale 
effects, a venture capital investor should avoid advising too many companies as its 
supporting role might subsequently deteriorate” (Kanniainen & Keuschnigg, 2004).  
Another important issue is that high-tech SMEs can find it difficult to attract capital 
compared to their larger competitors. In the UK where technology represents over a 
quarter of the total investment by the venture capital industry, for the 1997-1999 period, 
formal venture capital only represented 1.3% of external finance to new high tech SME’s 
(Lockett, Murray, & Wright, 2002). In the US the National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF) indicated that only 1/3 of the 4% of the corporations that attempted to 
raise private equity from new outside investors over a three year period were successful 
(Fenn & Liang, 1998). The above statistics clearly demonstrate that SMEs need to come 
up with alternative ways of funding or ways of making themselves more attractive to 
venture capitalists. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that raising the venture capital fund itself is also based 
significantly on skills: “Not only it is difficult to raise a new venture capital fund without 
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tract record, but the skills needed for successful venture capital investing are difficult and 
time-consuming to acquire” (Kanniainen & Keuschnigg, 2004). One could argue that 
when the entrepreneurs seeks external funding, what he actually seeks is proven fund 
raising skills: “with the venture capitalist the entrepreneur recruits an active investor who 
will assist in the construction process”(von Burg & Kenney, 2000). 
Academics 
Although a great deal of research has been undertaken in the area of entrepreneurship 
there are still many open questions. First of all there exists no distinct theory of 
entrepreneurship; nor a widely accepted definition for entrepreneurship. This has 
complicated interpretation of the entrepreneurship-related literature, as each analysis 
depends on the author’s interpretation  (Alvarez & Barney, 2004; Carland & Carland, 
1988; Davidsson, 2003; Gartner, 1988; Low, 2001; Low & MacMillan, 1988; Shane, 
Locke, & Collins, 2003; Shook, Priem, & McGee, 2003). These approaches “have led to 
a selection of samples of entrepreneurs that are hardly homogeneous” (Gartner, 1988). 
Instead of focusing on who the entrepreneur is and why entrepreneurs start new ventures, 
the skills brokerage business model is focused on how activities that lead to a venture 
starting-up and surviving can be facilitated.  
In addition, “the bulk of research, which comprises much of our knowledge of 
entrepreneurship, suffers from selection bias, the result of sampling only successful 
emergent entrepreneurs or enterprises” (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Krueger, Reilly, & 
Carsrud, 2000). This is of greater importance when it comes to markets where association 
with unsuccessful projects is avoided at all cost in order to avoid the stigma of failure: 
“the popular business press, in general, is far more interested in the route to success, 
 27 
however difficult this may have been, than in the unsuccessful entrepreneur” (Dodd, 
2002).  The skills brokerage business model will allow studying the skill brokers’ 
decision-making process and their criteria to invest or not. In doing so, and by monitoring 
a venture’s progress with or without skills investment our research could help establish a 
relationship on the value of skills in newly created ventures. 
The skills brokerage business model can also provide a unique insight into the start-
up process following entrepreneurs from the very early stages. Most importantly it can do 
so in real time (Gartner, 1988). This is of importance as most of the data about 
entrepreneurs and their ventures is collected retrospectively, giving rise to “a potential 
bias due to memory decay and hindsight bias, or rationalization after the fact” (Amit et 
al., 2001; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Landstrom, 1998; Shook et al., 2003) 
Another interesting point is that the above can be done in the context of multiple 
projects. As a skill broker can invest in multiple ventures, it should be possible to deduce 
the effect that the project itself may have on the broker. 
In addition, the model could allow researchers to study conditions in which potential 
entrepreneurs actively search for opportunities and draw comparisons with conditions in 
which potential entrepreneurs discover opportunities without actively searching. (Shook 
et al., 2003) It could also allow studying the role of networks in facilitating 
entrepreneurship and their effects on venture performance (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
Finally, the skills brokerage business model can contribute to empirical 
entrepreneurship research by studying induced entrepreneurial situations and experiments 
and simulations (Davidsson, 2003). In our case the entrepreneurial experiment is not just 
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a laboratory experiment, as it has been previously proposed (Shook et al., 2003), but real 
venture creation. 
Future Research 
In the previous sections we outlined the implications that the skills brokerage 
business model can have for entrepreneurs, policy makers, business support 
organisations, incubators, venture capitalists and academics. Future research is needed to 
address these separately in other markets and environments.  
More specifically, for entrepreneurs research is needed to establish the attractiveness 
of the model. This should be undertaken taking into consideration the different types of 
entrepreneurs, e.g. first-time entrepreneurs vs. serial entrepreneurs. The applicability of 
the model in different markets should also be researched, identifying the importance of 
skill sets in the context of the start-up process. Such research could also examine 
entrepreneurs’ awareness of the limitations of existing skill sets (Lyons, 2000) and 
investigate the implications, especially when it comes to venture growth. 
For business support organisations and business incubators, action research could be 
used to test the model in a real environment. Skills can be brought together to help 
entrepreneurs start their ventures. Such action research would also provide a unique 
insight into the start-up process, resolving many of the methodological issues mentioned 
in the previous section. 
Furthermore, the model itself could be studied from many different angles. For 
example one could study the theoretical and practical implications that the skills 
brokerage approach could have on organisational design, contributing to literature on 
virtual and networked organisations. Skills brokerage could also be studied as a business 
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model from the skills broker’s point of view and as a model for creating competitive 
advantages for existing firms, looking at the implications for corporate entrepreneurship. 
Finally, social network analysis techniques could be employed to map the 
relationships between entrepreneurs in clusters. For example, in the North East of 
England there exist a very vivid digital media cluster and a number of networking 
organisations. Social network analysis could examine the relationships and network 
dynamics within these organisations. In doing so it could potentially reveal whether skills 
brokerage is taking place and if yes to what extend.  
Conclusion 
This paper presented the skills brokerage business model which could facilitate 
business start-ups and enhance their chance of survival in the context of the networked 
economy.  The model is based on the concept of an entrepreneur sharing the venture’s 
returns or even ownership with a skills broker in exchange for skills. This exchange can 
significantly reduce barriers in network-oriented and information-driven markets where 
skills are of critical importance.  It can also significantly alleviate the cash flow problems 
which are typical of many new start-ups and are a main cause of business failure.  The 
model is particularly relevant to information intensive ventures, where the value of a 
service is often significantly higher than the actual cost incurred by the skills providers in 
providing the service.  If the model can be made to work, it can not only significantly 
increase the number of business start-ups, but also enhance their chances of survival.  In 
this paper, we illustrated this new business model and explored its implications for 
theory, practice and policy.  
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